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Philosophers of liberalism from Rousseau to Rawls have 
placed the good citizen at the centre of the liberal political 
arrangements they advocate. These good citizens bear 
their obligations and exercise their rights within the law 
of nation states. They enjoy status in their communities, 
communities to which they owe allegiance. Conceptions 
of the nature of this citizenship vary widely. Some have a 
trace of the totalitarian. Rousseau famously argued that 
humans living in a society must reconcile their own sense of 
subjective freedom with the objective need to act correctly 
(Rousseau, 1762, chs 5-8). In a state of nature they live 
only for themselves; as citizens they cease to be individual 
units and become parts of the new unit, the community. 
Independence is exchanged 
for dependence. Other 
philosophers emphasise the 
capacity of citizens living in 
a community for rational 
choice. Rawls argues that 
citizens have the capacity to 
pursue their own conception 
of what is good and share 
a conception of primary 
goods such as the basic 
liberties within a society 
defined by fairness (Rawls, 
2001, part 1). Macedo argues 
that public justification of 
the community’s action 
is critical, making all 
participants ‘a community 
of interpreters, a citizenry 
of self-critical reason givers’ 
(Macedo, 1991, p.78).
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Global citizenship
Whether notional equivalents to this 
national citizenship exist at a global 
level – global citizens, living in a global 
community, who must reconcile their 
subjective freedom with the needs of 
the global community, who may do so 
because they share a global conception of 
the good, and to which the community 
must justify its actions – has been a subject 
of debate for some time (Archibugi, 2008; 
Dunoff and Trachtman, 2009). One of the 
principal motivations for this concern 
has been the necessity for some form of 
effective global citizenship to make for 
continued human viability in the face of 
environmental catastrophe (Falk, 1993, 
pp.39, 41). Falk describes the rationalist-
elitist embodiment of this notion:
[T]he global citizen as a type of 
global reformer: an individual who 
intellectually perceives a better 
way of organizing the political 
life of the planet, and favors a 
utopian scheme that is presented 
as a practical mechanism. Typically 
such a global citizen has been the 
advocate of world government 
or of a world state or a stronger 
United Nations – accepting some 
kind of political centralization as 
indispensable to overcome today’s 
political fragmentation and economic 
disparities. (ibid., p.42)
Embodying commitment to a kind 
of idealistic imperialism, this approach 
to global citizenship contrasts with the 
parochial reality of the transnational 
global citizen doing business (whether it 
be commercial, governmental, moral or 
whatever) in different places, connected, 
networked. There are other such 
conceptions, yet all embrace a completely 
de-territorialised concept of citizenship 
which presents unique problems of the 
definition of the criteria for and quality 
of membership of this global political 
community. To put it crudely, what status 
does the global citizen enjoy, how do they 
qualify to enjoy it, and in what do they 
enjoy it? The state appears always to be 
in the way, to obscure the relationship 
of individuals with a global society of 
individuals. 
Global criminals
This is particularly so in regard to the 
position of those who do not only not 
meet their social obligations, who do 
not share a sense of the good, but who 
deliberately flout the law, who share a sense 
of the bad and how they can profit from 
it. At a national level they are considered 
criminals, and when convicted they may 
lose some of their freedoms, such as 
physical liberty, and rights of citizenship, 
such as voting.1 However, when these 
individuals cross borders, or the effects 
of their actions cross borders, they 
become transnational criminals. Pirates, 
slavers, drug traffickers, bribers, human 
traffickers, people smugglers, terrorists, 
organised criminals, money launderers, 
cybercriminals, environmental criminals, 
weapons traffickers, illicit traffickers 
in cultural property, organ traffickers, 
fraudsters, counterfeiters, identity thieves, 
damagers of undersea pipelines, or 
some other type of criminal, all engage 
the interests of other states, potentially 
many other states. They engage with and 
become subject to the substantive criminal 
jurisdiction of states, a jurisdiction which, 
relying upon an increasingly tenuous link 
between the interests of the state and that 
individual’s actions, has steadily enlarged 
beyond state territory. In many cases 
states take jurisdiction over individuals 
who are not their nationals and who do 
not enjoy any of the rights or privileges of 
citizenship within those states. 
The ‘bad man’ view of global citizenship
When criminals network with other 
criminals across borders, they engage, as 
Falk terms it, in a kind of globalisation 
‘from below’ (Falk, 1993, p.39). This 
position also dictates their view of the law. 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously 
said that ‘if you want to know the law 
and nothing else, you must look at it as a 
bad man, who cares only for the material 
consequences which such knowledge 
enables him to predict’ (Holmes, 1897). 
What does the bad man who traffics 
across borders want to know about what 
the global community expects of them? 
They probably think only of the laws in 
the states in which they operate, from the 
perspective of how to avoid being caught 
and punished for breaking those laws (if 
there is any practical likelihood of that 
occurring). They consider these laws 
only to try to avoid them by secrecy, or 
through corruption or coercion. Should 
this dictate the global response – should 
they fall outside the law because they 
undertake criminal activity and do not 
enjoy the protection of citizenship? 
According to the ancient English 
concept of outlawry: ‘he who breaks 
the law has gone to war with the 
community; the community goes 
to war with him. It is the right and 
duty of every man to pursue him, to 
ravage his land, to burn his house, to 
hunt him down like a wild beast and 
slay him; for a wild beast he is; not 
merely is he a “friendless man”, he is 
a wolf.’ (Harvard Law Review, 1989, 
p.1301, n.6)
Are these transnational criminals 
(or modern global outlaws) rightly 
considered fair game by all comers? One 
thinks, for example, of Somali pirates 
captured and apparently executed by 
Russian naval forces to global clamour 
(Hussein, 2010). Or are they just bad 
global citizens, whose community is, 
because of their activities, the globe; who 
can be punished because of the harm 
When criminals network with other 
criminals across borders, they engage, 
as Falk terms it, in a kind of globalisation 
‘from below’...
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they cause but who should be able to 
seek some minimum levels of protection 
from that community? The answer to this 
question dictates the quality of the global 
criminal justice response to transnational 
crime. Will it respect fundamental values 
of legality and due process, or will it 
permit states by omission to ignore 
human rights obligations to foreign 
criminals? 
The response: transnational criminal law
The legal response of the international 
community has been to adopt ‘rules and 
legal instruments … specifically created 
to deal with transnational criminal 
matters’ (Gless and Veryaele, 2013, p.3). 
Bad citizens are subject to globalisation 
‘from above’. They are the objects of the 
collaboration of states which use different 
kinds of international instruments to 
suppress transnational crime. States 
rely on crime suppression conventions 
such as the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime,2 
adopted with the goal of standardising 
crimes at the national level and making 
possible international cooperation in the 
investigation, extradition and prosecution 
of criminals who commit serious crimes 
transnationally. Authoritative decisions 
of intergovernmental organisations, such 
as Security Council resolution 21783 
on foreign fighters, go even further and 
institute extensive preventive measures 
against potential transnational criminals 
prior to any action on their part. Soft law 
such as the Financial Action Task  Force’s 
International Standards on Combating 
Money Laundering and the Financing 
of Terrorism and Proliferation4 provide 
for a much tougher sanctions-backed 
implementation regime than more formal 
treaty obligations. States are constantly 
urged to join new multilateral systems to 
suppress crimes. In recent years we have 
seen a proliferation of new regimes to 
combat activities such as counterfeiting of 
medicine5 and the smuggling of tobacco,6 
and moves towards suppression of piracy 
of intellectual property on the internet 
(see Urbas, 2012).
These systems foster criminalisation 
and the processing of alleged criminals. 
But whatever form this intervention 
takes, this is not a direct ordering by the 
international community of the lives 
of individuals. The state intrudes as the 
mediator of these rules because of the 
maintenance of the right to take coercive 
action against individuals as a prerogative 
of sovereignty. There is, thus, no single 
point of origin for these transnational 
criminal laws; there are rather multiple 
points of origin. These points of origin 
may be the unilateral domestic actions 
of states, or agreements based on treaties 
or other more informal relations between 
states, or perhaps even arise out of the 
actions of transnational actors such as 
intergovernmental organisations, or even 
companies, such as the banks engaged in 
self-regulation for anti-money laundering 
purposes (which accords more with the 
private law notion of transnational legal 
activity). The system is plural – the order 
dispersed in nature. 
The single nexus all of these rules 
have, however, is a focus on cross-
border crime. There are two interesting 
things about this response. First, if these 
instruments designed by the international 
community to suppress transnational 
crime can be said to express the notion 
of global citizenship at all, it is from 
the point of view that they do so only 
through expressing the belief that only 
an increase in the exercise of power and 
authority of states on a global scale can 
serve the interests of all. To put it another 
way, the one group of individuals that 
globalisation really pays attention to is 
global criminals, if only to suppress their 
activities. Second, these instruments 
pay little attention to the rights of these 
criminals; in their silence they reinforce 
an implicit conception of transnational 
criminals as global outlaws. 
Systemic human rights risks for global 
criminals
The human rights regulation of national 
criminal justice systems is generally weak 
(see Currie, 2015). But the systems also 
entrench systemic abuse because the 
international agreements to suppress 
transnational crime call for severe action 
based on ambiguous principles. One 
result, for example, is that developing 
states which struggle to comply engage 
in symbolic commitments to severe 
practices through the use of, for example, 
heavy punishments to make up for 
their poor enforcement of these treaty-
derived laws. There is, in addition, no 
basic transnational standard for a ‘fair 
trial’ beyond a state’s domestic criminal 
jurisdiction, something which effects 
the investigation and extradition of 
transnational criminals (Gless and 
Vervaele, 2013, p.6). Gless makes 
the point that when international 
instruments for the suppression of 
crime are developed, state participants 
seem primarily concerned with the 
establishment and enforcement of their 
own ius puniendi and the limitation of the 
ius puniendi of other states, rather than 
with the plight of the individuals subject 
to the system (Gless, 2015, p.119ff). She 
notes that from the defendant’s point 
of view transnational criminal law does 
not look coherent at all, but rather like a 
patchwork of laws made of overlapping 
national criminal jurisdictions (p.127). 
In a system where states retain their 
independent authority to enforce their 
jurisdiction, yet are urged to cooperate, 
defendants may find themselves subject 
to multiplications of penal power. Hence 
she argues for the urgent necessity 
to adopt an approach that places the 
individual defendant at the centre of 
transnational criminal relations, not as 
There is ... no basic transnational standard 
for a ‘fair trial’ beyond a state’s domestic 
criminal jurisdiction, something which 
effects the investigation and extradition of 
transnational criminals ...
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an object but as a rights holder.
Gless supports adoption of a global 
rule against double jeopardy that does 
not only prevent double prosecution 
for the same actions, which is currently 
not prevented, but also prevents parallel 
prosecution, and deals with situations 
where some states criminalise particular 
activity while other states do not. For 
example, states that seek cooperation 
from other states against transnational 
criminals through extradition must 
provide a functional equivalent to the 
constitutional protections they afford 
their own citizens who are exposed to 
prosecution (ibid., pp.130-4). Gless’s 
argument echoes Benvenisti’s general 
view that states owe obligations to 
foreign individuals caught in their web of 
authority because the state, as a trustee of 
humanity, must express the basic moral 
obligation that every individual exercise 
their own self-determination in a way 
that takes account of others’ interests 
(Benvenisti, 2013, p.300ff). 
Full global citizenship for bad global citizens
The same argument can be made in regard 
to the global polity. The suppression 
conventions create a negative global 
citizenship in the sense that they are 
bearers of obligations not to commit 
certain crimes against the interests of 
large hegemonic states. At a practical 
level Benvenisti accepts that the state 
must be, at least for the moment, the 
instrument of the global polity for the 
protection of transnational criminals 
from that global polity. The globalisation 
of rights and protections more explicitly 
to bad global citizens from the laws 
created to suppress their activities is 
a necessary step to granting these bad 
citizens the quality of protection any 
citizen deserves. Transnational criminal 
law needs principles of criminalisation, 
as well as principles of establishment and 
enforcement jurisdiction. Gless makes the 
point that these global principles cannot 
be set at a high level of abstraction; they 
have to be principles that can shape and 
direct the application of national rules 
in these situations. These principles can 
be deduced from the normative aims of 
transnational criminal law or through 
empirical analysis of existing rules within 
the system (Gless, 2015, p.136). 
There does appear to be a growing 
consciousness, if only at a rhetorical 
level, of the need to protect the 
rights of transnational criminals. The 
disasters of the global war on drugs 
are a case in point. It has been accused 
of allowing law enforcement to make 
war on minority communities such as 
black Americans (Davis, 2003). Severe 
treatment of alleged offenders and 
severe punishment of offenders largely 
acts as a surrogate for effective action to 
control the global drugs market. Human 
rights NGOs point out that Iran’s 
interdiction programmes, for example, 
supported by Western and other donors 
and through the UN Office of Drugs 
and Crime, have enabled the execution 
of significant numbers of convicted 
drug traffickers in spite of donor state 
and official UN positions that condemn 
the use of the death penalty (Reprieve, 
2015). Of more immediate relevance to 
New Zealand, Anthony DeMalmanche, 
a New Zealand national, was convicted 
in Indonesia for drug trafficking 
offences despite raising evidence that 
he had been duped into trafficking 
the drugs, and was sentenced to 15 
years’ imprisonment (Dunleavey and 
Cowlishaw, 2015). At the 2016 special 
session of the UN General Assembly 
on the world drug problem the General 
Assembly adopted resolution S-30/1, 
which makes the following operational 
recommendation on proportionate and 
effective policies and responses, as well 
as legal guarantees and safeguards in 
criminal justice. States agreed to 
(o) Promote and implement effective 
criminal justice responses to drug-
related crimes to bring perpetrators 
to justice that ensure legal guarantees 
and due process safeguards 
pertaining to criminal justice 
proceedings, including practical 
measures to uphold the prohibition 
of arbitrary arrest and detention 
and of torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment and to eliminate 
impunity, in accordance with relevant 
and applicable international law and 
taking into account United Nations 
standards and norms on crime 
prevention and criminal justice, and 
ensure timely access to legal aid and 
the right to a fair trial.7 
However, this is just one area of 
action in a particular silo in transnational 
criminal law. Full realisation of human 
rights protection of global bad citizens 
requires a conscious rebalancing of the 
interests of effective crime control. 
Conclusion: principles for the suppression of 
global crime
 A rough framework for policymaking 
in this field should ask the following 
principle-based questions about any 
proposed new international instrument 
for the suppression of crime.
General
•	 What	evidence	supports	the	
identification of specific threats as 
harmful and does it justify either the 
use of criminal sanction or the use of 
the specific procedural mechanisms 
recommended? 
•	 Are	the	principles	in	the	proposed	
treaty/international instrument etc. 
acceptable to all potential parties 
The suppression conventions create a 
negative global citizenship in the sense 
that they are bearers of obligations not 
to commit certain crimes against the 
interests of large hegemonic states.
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and not bound to any single legal 
tradition? (Bock, 2013, p.184) 
•	 Does	the	proposed	instrument	
adhere to the principle of legality by 
vesting the jurisdiction to prescribe 
certain crimes and to adjudicate and 
enforce those crimes in a competent 
lawmaker? (Luchtman, 2013, pp.13, 
14)
•	 Does	the	proposed	instrument	
adhere to lex certa: i.e. will what is 
to be criminal be readily known and 
available, certain and clear? (Ireland-
Piper, 2013, p.87)
Principles for substantive criminalisation and 
punishment
•	 Does	the	proposed	instrument	
embrace the principle of personal 
guilt as a prerequisite to criminal 
liability by making clear provision for 
conduct and fault in the definitions 
of proposed criminal offences? (Bock, 
2013, p.184) 
•	 Does	the	proposed	instrument	
embrace the principle of certainty 
of punishment by making clear 
provision for the type and measure 
of punishment to be meted out? 
Principles for the establishment of criminal 
jurisdiction
•	 Does	the	proposed	instrument	adopt	
clear and recognised principles of 
jurisdiction, both territorial and 
extra-territorial, which establish a 
sufficiently close connection between 
the state concerned and the alleged 
crime in question to justify that state 
establishing jurisdiction?
•	 Does	the	proposed	instrument	spell	
out clearly a theory of precedence in 
cases of concurrent jurisdiction?
Principles for the enforcement of criminal 
jurisdiction through procedural cooperation
•	 Does	the	proposed	instrument	
prohibit double jeopardy (ne bis in 
idem) so as to avoid the prospect of 
repeat prosecution for essentially the 
same offending?
•	 Does	the	proposed	instrument	
guarantee respect for human rights, 
such as privacy in exchange and 
storage of information, whether 
pre-investigation, for the purposes of 
investigation or for the purposes of 
trial?
•	 Does	the	proposed	instrument	
guarantee respect for human rights 
and fair treatment at all stages of 
proceedings, from investigation 
through to punishment, including 
enjoyment of all rights and 
guarantees provided by the domestic 
law of the party in the territory in 
which that person is present? 
•	 Does	the	proposed	instrument	
provide that all criminal charges 
be brought before a tribunal 
established by law, or, in the case 
of administrative action, include 
the right of the judiciary to exercise 
oversight? 
Luchtman questions the theoretical 
basis for holding that these bad citizens 
are bearers of rights under transnational 
criminal law (Luchtman, 2013, p.11). 
Is it because we are all Kantian global 
cosmopolitans, or just because we are 
human? However we construe our 
relationship with the global polity, we can 
all potentially be bad citizens. Ironically, 
the need to provide these bad citizens 
with protection is likely to become 
more pressing as global problems begin 
to bite, and individuals take advantage 
of the commercial opportunities these 
problems present. The market potential is 
enormous, for example, for the trafficking 
in the victims of global warming and the 
smuggling of people attempting to escape 
drowning and burning lands. How will 
we respond as global citizens when we 
catch these traffickers? Badly?
1 Although to what extent is a matter of debate: see, for 
example, Schall, 2006. 
2 The United Nations Convention against Transnational 
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4 FATF (2012, updated 2016), International Standards on 
Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism 
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of medical products and similar crimes involving threats 
to public health (or MEDICRIME convention), 28 October 
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6 See Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework 
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